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The discretion that law grants may be examined a s  a quality of rules, as  a quality of 
behavior or as a sense that people have of their freedom to act. Thus legal rules give discretion, 
people exercise discretion and individuals contemplating or reflecting on action may feel as  if their 
actions are or were discretionary. Discretion as  a quality of rules is a topic much mooted by legal 
philosophers and lawyers writing from an analytic perspective (Barak, 1989; Dworkin, 1978; 
Fletcher, 1984; Greenawalt, 1975; Hart and Sachs, 1958; Post, 1984; Rosenberg, 1970-71). 
Discretion in its other two senses is more appropriately studied by social scientists. While the 
phenomenology of legal discretion has received little empirical attention, discretionary behavior 
has been the focus of considerable research by social scientists and empirically oriented lawyers 
studying the legal system. (See e.g. Alschuler, 1975, 1976; Davis, 1969; Emerson, 1983; 
Goldstein, 1960; Hawkins, 1984; Heumann, 1977; Kagan, 1978; Pepinsky, 1984; Schubert, 1963; 
Skolnick, 1966, 1967; Sudnow, 1965.) 
Most philosophers who write on legal discretion are thinking primarily of judicial discretion 
and in particular of law-making discretion or discretion to determine the legal implications of an 
act. From the philosophical discussion two principles emerge. The first is the idea that legal 
discretion is authorized choice. Thus Hart and Sachs (1958) write, discretion is "the power to 
choose between two or more courses of action each of which is thought of as  permissible." 
Dworkin (1978) says that a judge has discretion if "he simply is not bound by the authority in 
question." And for Greenawalt (19751, who has written one of the clearest and most helpful 
articles on the topic, "discretion exists if there is more than one decision that will be considered 
proper by those to whom the decision maker is responsible, and whatever external standards may 
I am indebted to Robert Post for clearly stating this point in a letter commenting on an earlier 
version of this manuscript. . 
be applicable either cannot be discovered by the decision maker or do not yield clear answers to 
the questions that must be decided." 
The second principle is that adjudicative discretion is more than simply the matter of being 
unbound by authority and in this sense free to choose from among a number of alternatives: it 
involves choosing within a context set by law. Law, in other words, both constrains a s  well as  
frees. I t  frees the adjudicator because it provides no uniquely correct decision in the 
circumstances, but it constrains the adjudicator because not every possible decision is permissible 
(Barak, 1989; 19). Without a freedom and constraint that are both rooted in law, there is no 
adjudicative discretion. Dworkin offers a nice image. "Discretion," he says, "like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as  an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction" (1978; 
31). When the discretion is adjudicative that doughnut is law (cf. Post, 1984). If the legal system 
does not allow the judge to choose, the judge is not exercising discretion but is instead flouting the 
law, and his decision might properly be reversed. Conversely, if the law places no constraints on 
the judge's choices, the judge is not exercising a legal discretion a t  all, but is acting within a realm 
where law does not apply. Thus, a judge may choose to wear blue pants or green pants or even 
no pants under his robe; but we would not call his decision an exercise of adjudicative (or legal) 
discretion. 
In discussing discretion, philosophers often point -- either hypothetically or actually -- to 
the exercise of discretion, but their concern is typically with the nature of rules and the ways in 
which or the degree to which rules authorize discretionary behavior, not with the behavior that 
occurs. One result is that when one thinks of judicial discretion one thinks of unpatterned judicial 
behavior. If a range of actions is permissible, there is no a g&gj reason to expect that one action 
within that range will be preferred to another. However, discretion is not only a property of legal 
rules; it is also a property of behavior. As a property of rules discretion need not shape behavior, 
for rules are not inexorably influential. Judges and others may choose to act where they have no 
rule-given discretion, and conversely, if they have discretion, they may not fully consider the 
range of choices discretion allows. Thus, as  a property of behavior, discretion need not reflect the 
leeway that discretion-conferring rules allow. If law is no guide, other social forces may be, and 
they may give rise to patterns of behavior that look, and in a sociological sense are, more rule- 
bound than behavior that is in theory rigorously structured by law. Indeed, discretion may invite 
social influences a s  a vacuum invites it own destruction. When law only loosely regulates 
decisions, other forces may arise that tighten that regulation. 
.For behaviorally oriented social scientists, judicial discretion has not been thexentral or 
even the most important locus of discretion in the legal system.. While there are empirical studies 
of judicial law making (Casper, 1976; Danelski, 1966; Schubert, 1963) and judicial sentencing (e.g. 
Cook, 1973; Hagan et al., 1983; Partridge and Eldridge, 1974; Uhlman and Walker, 1980), these 
tend to focus more on the correlates and predictors of discretionary decision making than on the 
manner in which discretion is exercised or the forces that channel discretion. Those interested in 
the latter issue and the way they culminate in "discretionary justice" tend to focus on social 
control agents that are closer than the courts to those who are subjects of legal control. 
Predominant among these are: the police (e.g. Black, 1980; Davis 1969; Goldstein, 1960; Reiss, 
1971; Skolnick, 1967), lawyers (e.g. Alschuler, 1975; Heumann, 1977; Sudnow, 1965; Skolnick, 
1966) and regulatory inspectors of various sorts (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; Ross 
and Thomas, 1981). 
Those who study how officials exercise discretion often do not focus on legal rules, for 
discretion is seen as  the result of social situations that both shape the exercise of discretion and 
make its exercise inevitable. Discretion exists not only where an agent is given authority to 
choose by statute or regulation, but it also exists where that authority is expressly denied. 
Skolnick's cops, for example, are exercising discretion when they guarantee a burglar lenient 
treatment if he will improve their clearance rate by confessing to numbers of crimes for which he 
has not been arrested (1966; 176-79) and Ross and Thomas's housing inspectors are exercising 
discretion when they pretend to authority they do not have (1981). The behaviorists, in other 
words, understand that legal actors always have discretion to ignore rules that deny them 
discretion. Whether this discretion is exercised depends both on the actor's role conception and on 
the degree to which the actors conduct is visible and vulnerable to sanctions or reversal. The 
situation of judges on these dimensions is in most respects less conducive to ignoring clear legal 
commands than the situations of the other major actors in the law's social control hierarchy. 
Both philosophers and social scientists give the impression that where discretion exists 
behavior is not controlled by rules. For the philosophers this is an analytic truth since if a rule did 
constrain behavior there would be no discretion. Social science studies give this impression not 
only because they focus on situational pressures that shape behavior, but also because the rules 
they most predominantly discuss are frequently legal rules from which behavior deviates. 
However, as  some (e.g. Sudnow, 1965; Ross, 1970) have recognized, one way in which actors can 
manage discretion is by establishing rules that as a behavioral matter take away much of the 
discretion that law or situation has allowed. 
?' he Empirical Study 
This paper is about the adjudicative discretion which Hawaiian state law gives a public 
housing eviction board. It is concerned not only with discretion as  a quality of behavior but also 
with the sense that adjudicators have of their discretion. The two are related, for an adjudicator's 
sense of discretion can shape the way discretion is exercised. Not only are adjudicators likely to 
respect the law where it appears to limit their discretion, but despite legal discretion adjudicators 
may establish norms that lead them to feel that they have no discretion in particular cases. In 
this paper I shall look at a variety of ways in which the eviction board I observed has exercised 
discretion, and I shall try to identify forces that shaped the board's discretion in particular cases 
and changed the pattern of discretionary decisions over time. 
The eviction board I studied hears the cases of almost all tenants whom the Hawaiian 
Housing Authority (HHA) seeks to evict from its public housing projects on the island of ~ a h u . ~  
Occasionally, when a quorum of the board cannot be mustered, the HHA will appoint a hearing 
officer to try cases. Also some tenants when threatened with eviction leave before the board can 
hear their cases. 
The board was authorized by state law in 1949 and established in 1957. However, I shall focus 
on the board as  it existed from 1960 on, which is when a board composed of three authority 
officials was replaced by one composed of five citizen volunteers. 
My investigation into the HHA7s eviction board occurred in two stages. The first stage 
which involved three months of field research during the summer of 1969 examined the eviction 
board from its inception until that point in time.3 The second stage which involved field work 
during the summer of 1987 examined the eviction board from 1966 until that point. During both 
stages I received the full cooperation of the HHA. I was able to interview the great majority of 
those people, except for tenants, who have been involved in the Authority's eviction process from 
1960 on. These interviews included eviction board members, Authority officials, including those 
responsible for prosecuting the Authority's cases before the board, project managers, and private 
and legal aid attorneys who have defended .tenants before the.board. I sat in on more than thirty 
eviction hearings, all those held during the two summers of my fieldwork. I read the full 
transcripts of more than 100 additional hearings, most involving cases from the early 1960s. I 
perused Authority records for any official documents or other materials relating to evictions. I 
collected and coded information from the records of more than 1400 eviction actions. And I read 
all the Federal' and state statutes and regulations relating to the eviction process that I could 
identify. 
I found that during the 18 years between my two visits, some aspects of the eviction 
process had remained the same, but othershad changed -- sometimes dramatically. The board's 
status, jurisdiction, and powers were officially the same. At both points in time the board was 
composed of citizen volunteers who were paid only a nominal sum ($10 a member a meeting in 
1987) for their services. Although the board .members were appointed by the Authority, they 
were independent of it. The board's chair was a board member, and neither the board nor its 
chair had to answer to the Authority for its decisions. The Authority was required to bring before 
the board any tenant it sought to evict, and the tenant had a right to a "full and fair hearing" 
Field work in Hawaii is a tough assignment, but someone has to do it. 
5 
which included the rights to know in advance why the Authority sought to evict, to present 
witnesses or documentary evidence, to cross-examine opposing witnesses and to be represented by 
c ~ u n s e l . ~  At both points in time the board had the power to acquit tenants, in which case they 
had to be allowed to remain; to evict tenants, in which case the Authority was granted a writ of 
possession without further litigation; or to conditionally evict tenants, in which case an eviction 
order would issue but its execution would be held in abeyance and eventually cancelled so long a s  
the tenant complied with the conditions specified.5 
The types of cases the board heard and its procedures for hearing these cases also looked 
much the same in 1969 and 1987. In both years and every year in between actions brought for 
non- payment- of rent dominated the docket, as non-payment was during this span the sole charge 
in about three-quarters of the cases, and was charged together with some other offense in an 
additional five percent of the actions. Other cases the boards heard involved what I call "trouble 
behavior." This includes such things a s  income falsificationY6 fighting, parking more than one car 
or a car that doesn't run, keeping pets, and allowing unauthorized guests to occupy units. 
Hearings were held around the same long table in the same conference room in 1969 and 
1987, and in many ways they looked similar. Lawyers were seldom present, rules of evidence 
were relaxed; conversation was informal; tenants who did not spontaneously excuse themselves 
would be invited to tell their stories, and board members would not only question tenants but 
In the early 1960s the Hawaii Housing Authority was apparently unique among American 
public housing authorities in the degree to which it extended these due process protections to 
tenants it sought to evict. In the 1970s federal rules extended in somewhat different form similar 
protections to tenants in all federally aided projects across the United States. 
These orders, called "conditional deferrals" or simply "conditions," were most common in cases 
brought for non-payment of rent, and the usual condition was that the tenant pay back the rent 
owing by a certain date and pay all rent when due for a certain period of time. A 1980 
amendment to the statute establishing the eviction board could be read as  removing the board's 
discretionary authority to issue conditional eviction orders where the HHA had proved a lease 
violation, but a 1982 statement by the lawyer who then handled the Authority's eviction cases did 
not interpret the law that way nor, in a training session held that year, was the board told that 
this was what it meant. 
At both points in time the rent in most of the HHAYs projects was set a t  a percentage of a 
family's annual income and there were income limits on eligibility for placement in the projects. 
In 1969 but not in 19.87 there were also income limits on continued occupancy. 
might advise them on how to deal with their problem or lecture them on their moral deficiencies. 
The hearings ordinarily lasted as long a s  the parties had something to say, which was most often 
in the twenty to thirty minute range, but was not infrequently somewhat longer, and cases lasting 
an hour or more o ~ c u r r e d . ~  Decisions were reached by the board in a brief discussion following 
the close of the case and the tenant and manager were immediately informed about what the 
board had decided. 
In other respects, however, there were marked differences in the situations I observed in 
1969 and 1987. Many of these were not observable from the hearing but rather concerned the 
Authority's project management and its officials' views of the appropriate scope of board 
discretion. In 1969 considerable discretion was granted project managers with respect to rent 
collection on the projects. Managers were free to "work with" tenants in financial difficulty, and it 
was largely up to the manager to decide if and when to bring a tenant before the eviction board. 
Thus when non:payment tenants were brought up for eviction, they commonly had three, four, or 
more months' rent owing. In 1987, thanks to computers, the central management staff knew as 
soon as  the project managers which tenants were behind on their rent, and project managers had 
to justify decisions not to seek eviction when tenants were more than six weeks in arrears. Thus 
many non-payment tenants who faced the board in 1987 owed two months' rent or less, and a 
number of them owed nothing because they had cleared their debts after being subpoenaed.8 In 
1969 the latter group would have had their cases cancelled. 
The longer cases are ordinarily trouble behavior cases in which the Authority presents a number 
of witnesses and in which tenants are disproportionately likely to be represented by attorneys 
(Lempert and Monsma, in press). The twenty to thirty minute hearings common in open and shut 
non-payment cases may seem short but are in fact longer than the typical hearing in a t  least 
some housing (Lazerson, 1982), small claims (Conley and OYBarr, in press), and misdemeanor 
courts (Mileski, 197 1). 
Cases were also more rapidly processed in 1987 because two full time staff positions -- a 
secretary and a lawyer -- were devoted to the management of the eviction process. In 1969 the 
eviction process was managed by the Supervising Public Housing Manager (SPHM) and a 
secretary, each of whom had numerous other responsibilities that they regarded a s  more central 
to their roles. 
In 1969 the Authority's central office officials, including its Supervising Public Housing 
Manager (SPHM), who was in charge of presenting cases to the eviction board, saw the board's 
independence a s  a virtue,' did not question the board's discretion to withhold eviction despite 
finding a lease violation, and regarded the conditional deferral a s  an appropriate decision when 
tenants owed rent. 10 
In 1987, by contrast, top Authority officials regarded the board a s  an awkwardly 
independent cog in the Authority's efforts to maintain peaceful, smooth running projects. While 
the board's power to conditionally defer was recognized, its discretion to do so was not respected 
and during the preceding seven years steps had been taken to minimize the occasions on which 
such discretion would be exercised. In 1979 a training session had been held for the board a t  
which the Authority's rent collection needs were emphasized. In 1982 the board chairs had been 
sent to "judge's school" in Reno, Nevada in the hope of promoting more legalistic decision making 
and another training session was held. Also beginning about 1980 fixed terms were established 
for board members and several were not reappointed because they were regarded as too pro- 
tenant, while new appointments were made with an  eye to whether they would appreciate the 
Authority's point of view. 
Some changes between 1969 and 1987 were visible just from observing hearings. The 
most obvious was that the board in 1987 consisted of fourteen members rather than five. In 1970 
two tenants were added to the eviction board to create a seven-member panel and in October 1979 
a second seven-member panel was created, with its own chair, so that eviction actions could be 
The law establishing the eviction board allowed the Authority to staff it with Authority officials, 
and it was so staffed before 1960. The Authority's central office official decided to reconstitute it 
a s  'an independent body staffed by community volunteers because, I was told, they did not want a 
"kangaroo court." 
lo Project managers did not share these views. Four of the five managers felt strongly that if 
they could prove a lease violation, they had the right to an eviction regardless of the credibility of 
a tenant's promise to reform. 
Y 
l1 In 1987 more board members worked in real estate property management than in any other 
occupation. In 1969 a majority of board members either had a social work background or did 
extensive volunteer work for the poor. 
heard every week rather than every other week, thus allowing the Authority to process cases 
more rapidly for eviction. As the panels never got together except for one or two parties a year, 
the situation was one of two seven-member eviction boards rather than one fourteen-member 
board.12 Another difference was that the Authority's cases were presented by an attorney, whom 
I shall call the DAG, '~  rather than by the SPHM. However, in many respects, the attorney 
proceeded at the hearing in much the same manner as  the SPHM had in 1969. Both acted 
informally. They avoided legal jargon except a t  the outset when the cause of action was 
explained, and they conversed with the tenant to make sure that her story came out. The SPHM, 
however, tended to leave the presentation of the Authority's case to the project manager while the 
DAG presented the details of the manager's report himself and relied on the project manager for 
confirmation and further information. 
A slighter difference between the hearings of 1969 and 1987 which an observer might 
have noticed, was that the board members in 1987 seemed less sympathetic to the tenants than 
they had in 1969. In 1987 the board members were less prone to delve into ways that the tenant 
might solve her problems and almost never questioned the adequacy of the project manager's 
efforts to "work with" the tenant. 
Finally, the possibility of an appeal to the Authority's Board of Commissioners was often 
mentioned during the 1987 hearings -- both before and after the board's decision was rendered -- 
but was seldom if ever mentioned in 1969. During his case presentation or summation the DAG 
emphasized the possibility of an appeal to remind the board members that even if they voted to 
l2 I shall refer to each panel as  the "eviction board." In the data I collected panel identity is not 
significantly related to case outcome. 
l3 DAG stands for Deputy Attorney General. The Authority's prosecutor from 1982 on was a 
Deputy Attorney General assigned by the Hawaii State Attorney General's Office to the HHA. 
Although the DAG remained technically a member of the Attorney General's Office and not of the 
HHA, for all practical purposes the DAG was an employee, reported in 1987 to the SPHM and 
through her to the Director of Housing Mangement @HM). The Authority had in 1979 appointed 
a full time eviction specialist to prosecute cases and handle the other legal and quasi-legal work 
necessary to a smooth running eviction process. The first such specialist was an Authority 
employee who was not a lawyer. His two sucessors were DAGs. As far as I can determine the 
presence of a full time eviction specialist was an important influence on the eviction process, but 
the fact that the specialist was a lawyer was not (Lempert, in press). 
evict, the tenant would not necessarily be forced to leave.14 After the decision, the appeal was 
discussed to make it clear to the tenant what she would have to do to remain in housing. In 1969 
such explanations were seldom necessary, for tenants were almost always allowed to stay. 
From the Authority's point of view the stress placed on the appeal process was made 
possible by a 1980 amendment to the Act establishing the eviction board which provided that 
appeals had to be based on "new facts or evidence pertinent to the case which could not have been 
presented and were not available for presentation" to the eviction board. l5 Before the law was 
amended the Commissioners had to hear appeals de BQYP, and any system that encouraged 
appeals would have been untenable. Indeed the burden of deciding whether an appeal presented 
new facts and evidence was eventually deemed excessive, and in 1984 this responsibility was 
delegated to the HHA's Executive Director. The result was that aftei 1984 appeals almost never 
reached the Commissioners unless it was a foregone conclusion that they would be allowed. 
Indeed, the Commissioners typically did not hear appeals but instead ratified "stipulated 
agreements" negotiated between the housing staff and the tenant which noted a s  a new fact that 
the tenant had fully corrected the problem giving rise to the board's eviction order (usually by 
paying an  outstanding rent debt) and stipulating that in exchange for the withholding of the 
eviction order the tenant agreed to comply fully with all lease provisions for a period of one year 
and to waive all rights to a hearing should any lease provision be violated within that time. 
The changes that occurred between 1969 and 1987 did not, of course, occur a t  the same 
time. Yet for purposes of investigating changes in the board's exercise of discretion, there are two 
watersheds. The first is in 1975. Nineteen-seventy-five marks a dramatic change in the 
leadership of the Authority as  well a s  the commencement of a law suit that a t  one time appeared 
l4 The attorney was also fond of reminding the board that evicting an apparently needy family 
would free an apartment for a family that would follow project rules and was presumptively just 
as needy. 
l5 Chapter 360 section 3 Hawaii Revised-Statutes as amended May, 1980. The. usual "new fact 
or evidence" that tenants alleged on appeal was that since the hearing they had repaid all the rent 
that was owing. The 1980 Amendments made some other changes in the law establishing the 
eviction board, but these need not concern us. 
to threaten the existence of the eviction board.16 Before 1975 cases were handled as they had 
been in 1969 or, for that matter, in 1961, and the outcomes were the same. The second 
watershed occurs in 1979. This is when a secretary was assigned full time to handle the 
paperwork of evictions, and a full time specialist was hired to process and prosecute eviction cases. 
I t  also marks the appointment of the second eviction panel which was formed by dividing the old 
panel in two and adding three new appointees to one group and four to another. After the 
.appointment of the second panel, the eviction process comes to look much like it looked when I 
observed it in 1987. The period between 1974 and 1979 is not so much a period of gradual 
change as  it was a period of upheaval and uncertainty (Lempert, in press; Lempert and Monsma, 
in press). Hence we shall not focus on these years when we discuss the transformation of 
discretion. 
With this information as background, we are now ready to examine the discretion the 
board exercised. First, I shall discuss several varieties of discretion that are illustrated by board 
decision making. Then we shall see that discretion may not only be influenced by external forces, 
but may be systematically transformed. 
Varieties of D i s c r e t h  
The Case of the &use That Burned 
In the 1960s, before the income limits for continued occupancy in federally-aided low 
income housing had been abolished, a family with eight children, let us call them the Teofilos,17 
l6 The specific changes need not concern us here, for their relevant consequences have been 
described. They involved the conversion of the HHA Executive Directorship from a Civil Service 
to a gubernatorial appointed position and the retirement of .the long time head of HHA -- who had 
come up through the housing management ranks -- and his replacement by a more business 
oriented head who had no prior housing experience. These changes in turn reflect vast new 
responsibilities -- including the task of building and selling middle income housing -- that had been 
given to the HHA in the 1980s and a local scandal that developed over the way these 
responsibilities were handled. .- 
The case that almost scuttled the eviction board also has little to do with this article. I t  is 
entitled IUm v. C h w  and is described in Lempert and Monsma (1989). 
exceeded the income limits and contracted to build a home. The day before the Teofilos were 
supposed to move and after the grace period which federal law gave them to find a home had 
expired, their new house burned to the ground. The Authority was not anxious to press the case 
for eviction, but felt that federal law required that action. The eviction board refused to issue the 
order. On several occasions it remanded the case to see if anything could be worked out and to 
give the Teofilos more time to find a home. One member who was involved in real estate went so 
far a s  to search for housing for the family on his own time. The board knew what the law 
required, but its members wished to avoid the force of the law. Indeed, in discussing what to do 
with the Teofilos one member said he would not evict no matter what the law required. 
Eventually the case was resolved when the Authority transferred the family to no-income-limit 
housing it operated for the Navy. Doing this breached both policy and regulatiorls, for the family 
had no Navy connection and was too large for the unit available, but the Authority apparently felt 
that it was less important to conform to these rules than to federal housing regulations. 
The board was able to exercise discretion effectively in this case because its actions were 
not reviewable. The board was given no legal authority to do anything other than evict, but i t  
could effectively refuse to evict because the law establishing it did not provide an avenue by which 
the Authority could appeal to a higher tribunal, and i t  did not allow the Authority to secure a writ 
of possession except by prevailing before its eviction board. The board was well aware of its 
power and that but for it the family would have been without decent shelter. 
What is most striking about this case is that it is apparently unique. While I could not 
look a t  every case the board heard over 30 years, my perusal of several years of case transcripts 
did not turn up any other case in which the board knowingly did something it was not empowered 
by law to do. Furthermore, I did not see such a case during the two summers I sat  in on board 
hearings, nor did I hear of such a case in my interviews with Authority officials, board members 
or project managers. The latter's silence is quite telling, for they freely complained about board 
decisions that in their view exceeded the board's proper authority. 
All names used in this article have been changed. 
The board's more usual attitude in over-income cases is expressed by the chair's statement 
to a couple with seven children, one of whom was a mute. This family had been unable to find a 
house because the private rental market provided little housing for moderate-income families with 
more than a few children: 
I regret very much to inform you of the decision we came to arbitrarily; it's one 
that we have no other recourse [sic] on account of the qualifications of the law 
governing a case such as  yours. We have to order eviction because there is no way 
we can do otherwise. 
The difference in the attitude expressed here and the attitude expressed in the case I first 
described cannot be explained by board composition since many of the same people sat  on both 
cases. I t  is explained, I believe, by the extraordinary nature of the tragedy that befell the first 
family. Almost all over income cases the board heard involved families who had been successful 
by middle class standards and who could not find suitable housing because of the tight nature of 
the housing market that confronted large families. The first case involved a family that had 
solved the housing problem in the then most culturally approved fashion -- buying a home -- only 
to have their house unexpectedly taken from them. 
It appears from both the philosophical and sociological literature that discretion in the 
sense of unreviewability is relatively common since it is easy to provide examples of adjudicators 
who have discretion to make decisions that are unreviewable and continually use that discretion 
(see, e.g. Rosenberg 1970-71). Consideration of the Hawaiian data suggests that there is a 
further important distinction to be made. Typically, when an adjudicator l i e  a multi-judge court 
has unreviewable discretion, it also has discretion in the rule-oriented sense that the authority to 
exercise judgment is entrusted to it; that is it is authorized to choose from a wide range of 
outcomes, any one of which is permissible. Indeed, a major reason for making an exercise of 
discretion unreviewable is that it is unlikely that a reviewing agency will be able to exercise better 
judgment. :The eviction board's members did not have discretion in this sense. The law did not 
allow them to exercise judgment about whether families that were over the income limits should 
be evicted once the statutory grace period had expired. They were mandated to evict in these 
circumstances. Their only discretion was whether to comply with their mandate. This discretion 
was effectively allotted them only because the Authority could not appeal from their decision. 
I t  is a mistake to think that the law authorizes this type of discretionary decision 
making.18 Rather the law establishes structural or legal conditions19 which ensure that a 
particular adjudicator's decisions will be complied with while not providing a way to effectively 
remedy errors through appeal. Such conditions give decision makers the power to force actions 
that do not comport with legal norms although as a matter of law they lack the authority. 
What the law can do for judges, other structural features do for other decision makers. 
Thus the cop on the beat who has stopped two youths in "the wrong neighborhood" may arrest the 
one who "gives him lip" and let the one who is respectful off (Black, 1971; Werthman and Piliavin, 
1967). The cop can do this not because the law provides that disrespect or being in the wrong 
neighborhood are crimes, but because the officer's power vis-a-vis youths is such that they must 
comply with his decisions, and the officer's "credibility advantage" coupled with the low visibility 
of the encounter means that if he later concocts an account of the encounter legally sufficient to 
justify arrest, he rather than the youth will be believed. The eviction board that spared the 
Teofilos was much like the cop except that its flouting of the law was more visible. However the 
Authority shared the board's sense that the Teofilos had done nothing that was unreasonable, and 
it was pressing for eviction only because it could be held accountable if it did not enforce federal 
income limits. Had the Authority been unsympathetic to the Teofilos, it might have found a way 
to impel the board to conform to the law. 
l8 The jury is perhaps the -best example of a legal decision maker that gains considerable 
discretionary power from the fact that its decisions are not reviewable. This power is not accorded 
the jury by law but is rather a matter of the jury's structural position. See Bushell's ca se ,  124 
Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670) and SDarf and _Hans on v. United States. 156 U.S. 5 1  (1895). 
l9 An example of a structural condition is the fact that in the United States there is no higher 
court than the Supreme Court and hence no appeal, except through a cumbersome amendment 
process, from its constitutional decisions. An example of a legal condition is a restriction on 
interlocutory appeal which allows a trial court to harm a party through a mistaken ruling in a 
way that a higher court cannot, even by reversing the decision below, fully undo. 
Discretion in the sense of unreviewability is common a t  the street or factory level (Lipsky, 
1980; Bardach and Kagan, 1982), and it might seem that it is common among adjudicators also. 
Looking at court decisions from the outside, there appear to be many situations in which 
adjudicators are able to enforce their will only because their decisions are unreviewable. But 
consider the matter from the adjudicator's point of view. The members of the eviction board in the 
Case of the House that Burned could and, in effect, did say, "The law required me to evict, but I 
exercised my discretion," meaning discretion in the sense of the power of unreviewability. 
Usually, however, it will appear to the adjudicator whose decision sticks because of 
unreviewability that his discretionary action (which just happens to be unreviewable) is in accord 
with a legal mandate to exercise judgment and is not a n  exercise of lawless power. The Teofilo 
case may be unique in my data because adjudicative discretion that exists only because 
unreviewability confers a power is, a t  least phenomenologically, rare. 2 0 
The Case of the Beans that Burned 
This case involved a Korean woman, whom I will call Mrs. Park, who lived in one of the 
Authority's high rise buildings for the elderly. On three separate occasions over two years, while 
boiling down beans with ginseng for an ethnic dish she enjoyed, Mrs. Park had forgotten she had 
beans cooking and left the apartment. On each occasion the beans boiled dry and then burned, 
sending smoke into the halls. After the third such incident the project manager sought to evict 
Mrs. Park because he thought that she was likely to forget again and that an overheated pot or 
burning beans might in some way spark a fire. He cited the woman for violating lease covenants 
relating to (a) not damaging the dwelling unit or causing insurance premiums to increase, (b) 
keeping the unit in a safe and sanitary condition, (c) using facilities only in a reasonable manner, 
20 Some project managers, on the other hand, knowingly denied tenants their right to an,eviction 
hearing by bluffmg them out (Lempert, 1989). They knew -their actions, which involved 
misleading notices and, on occasion, blatant lies, were unauthorized denials of rights given tenants 
by Authority policy. They saw bluffing as  a way of recapturing from the board a discretion -- to 
decide when tenants could not be "saved" -- that was rightfully theirs. The bluff system began in 
the mid-1960s and endured for about a decade. 
and (d) conducting oneself so as not to disturb the neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of their 
accommodations and maintaining the housing project in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition. 
When I discussed this case with the Authority's prosecutor the day it was to be heard, we 
both expected Mrs. Park to be growing feeble minded as well as  old and increasingly incapable of 
living alone. At the hearing, however, a different picture emerged. Mrs. Park came to the 
hearing with a lawyer, a minister who translated for her since she did not speak English, a 
Korean speaking neighbor, and a petition signed by many of the building's tenants saying that 
they wanted her to remain and would look after her. She looked as if she were about 70 and quite 
capable of looking after herself. The evidence a t  the hearing was that she was well-regarded by 
the neighbors and was an active volunteer in her church, who was there almost every day and 
could greet each of the 500 or so church members by name. While the project manager made a 
convincing case that the building was constructed so that a fire would be especially dangerous, 
Mrs. Park's advocates showed that, with the exception of one occasion when the hot pot was 
apparently dropped, scorching part of a rug, no damage had been done by the several incidents. 
Except for these incidents, the project manager agreed, Mrs. Park was a good tenant and a 
pleasant person. The Korean-speaking neighbor who lived across the hall was a friend who said 
that she would look in on Mrs. Park daily and boil beans for her once a month, the schedule Mrs. 
Park had followed. 
Perhaps the key to the hearing was that the Authority's prosecutor did not think that Mrs. 
Park should be evicted, nor did he think that the board would be willing to evict her. Thus he 
shaped the discussion so that it focused on steps that could be taken to ensure that Mrs. Park 
would not pose a fire hazard if she stayed. Mrs. Park's lawyer had the same agenda, hence the 
offer by the neighbor to look in on her. There was also some discussion about whether Mrs. Park 
would be willing to give up her stove and cook with a microwave instead. 
The prosecutor had perhaps misjudged the board. At the start of its deliberations one 
member, a real estate manager who had just joined the board, moved to evict. Eventually the 
motion was defeated, and a conditional eviction -- a form of probation -- was voted. The conditions 
were that the Authority remove Mrs. Park's stove within a week, that Mrs. Park secure a 
microwave to replace it, and that there be no further incidents for three years. I t  is impossible to 
say whether this decision, as  opposed to an outright eviction, would have been reached had the 
prosecutor not obviously favored a compromise of this sort. The member who moved for eviction 
was intelligent and articulate and he might have persuaded a majority of the board to go along 
with him had the Authority's representative been pressing for the same action. 
The board in this example is exercising three kinds of discretion. First the board has 
discretion to determine whether there is a lease violation. The determination is discretionary in 
the sense that the judgment is entrusted to the board and the board must pick out those facts that 
bear on its decision making task (Barak, 1989:13). If burning beans does not violate any of the 
cited lease provisions, not only will the woman avoid eviction, but she may go on burning beans to 
her heart's content. The second, which is dependent on finding a lease violation, involves deciding 
whether to allow Mrs. Park to remain in housing despite the lease violation.21 
The third locus for discretion, which is dependent on both finding a lease violation and 
determining that alternatives to eviction should be explored, is in deciding the conditions under 
which the woman will be allowed to remain. This discretion too is not clearly confided by the 
statute authorizing the eviction board, but is firmly rooted in the board's "common law" and would 
be regarded by both the board members and the Authority as  a necessary concomitant of the 
board's power to withhold eviction when the Authority has presented a legally sufficient case. 
21 From the face of the statute, particularly after it was amended in 1980, it is not clear that the 
board is authorized to exercise such discretion but the board's statute has always been interpreted ' 
by it and the Authority to confide such discretion in it. 
The existence of this discretion was acknowledged in a 1982 memorandum describing the 
powers of the eviction board that the Deputy Attorney General who ran the Authority's eviction 
process wrote to the acting SPHM: 
The Hawaii Housing Authority's hearing boards perform three basic functions: 
determining whether tenants violated provisions of the rental agreement with the 
Authority; determining whether the rental agreement should be terminated a s  a 
result of the violation; and determining whether tenants should be evicted for the 
aforementioned violations. 
According to a "script" in the Authority's files, a similar description of the board's powers, 
with explicit mention of the power to set conditions, was given to the board members a t  a training 
session held for them in 1982. 
The existence of analytically distinct forms of discretion does not, however, mean that all 
forms will be equally salient to .those involved in the decision making process. Ordinarily only two 
discretionary decisions are salient, but they are not the same for tenants and project managers on 
the one hand and the board members on the other.22  of the parties, the first two types of 
discretion -- determining whether there is a legal cause for eviction and if so whether eviction 
should follow -- are lumped together and important while the third is distinct and subsidiary. 
Thus both the tenant and the projects managers are interested in whether the tenant will be 
evicted immediately or allowed to stay. It  does not matter whether the tenant is allowed to stay 
because no lease violation has been found or whether despite a ,lease violation the tenant is not 
expelled. When the tenant avoids immediate eviction, the tenant regards the decision a s  a victory, 
and the manager regards it as  a loss regardless of the conditions that are set and the implications 
that these conditions have for the tenant's prospects of avoiding eviction in the long run. The 
tenant's attitude is like that of the criminals described in a number of plea bargaining studies who 
focus on the sentence which might be received and are relatively indifferent to whether the 
sentence is a result of charge or sentence bargaining, even though the charge pleaded to will 
become a matter of record that may have substantial future implications. 
From the board's standpoint it is the first type of discretion on the one hand and the 
second and third types on the other which are distinct. The board must decide whether there has 
been a lease violation and, if so, how to dispose of the case. The former determination seldom 
poses any difficulties. But in dealing with the latter issues, the decisions on whether to allow the 
tenant to stay and on the conditions to be imposed if the tenant does stay are typically 
inseparable. Assuming a lease violation has been proven, the more likely it is that the tenant can 
cure that violation and not violate again, the more likely it is that the tenant will be given another 
22 All these stages appear salient to the DAG, a t  least in some cases. He recognizes that he must 
show a lease violation, and while he argued in 1987 that it was inappropriate for the board to 
refuse evictions when it found that a tenant had not fully met her rent payment obligations, he 
never argued that it was beyond the board's power to do so. Thus he was aware of the board's 
discretion to refuse eviction notwithstanding a lease violation and if so, he recognized, as  in Mrs. 
Park's case, that the conditions set by the board were important. 
chance conditional on the cure and subsequent good behavior. Conversely, even a sympathetic 
tenant may face eviction if it appears unlikely that future violations can be prevented. Thus, had 
there been no way to meet the Authority's concerns regarding the fire hazard Mrs. Park posed, 
she would not have been allowed to stay. Indeed, a t  one it appeared that the board's 
decision might become unraveled because it was unclear that federal regulations allowed the 
removal or disconnection of a tenant's stove even when all. parties desired it.23 Similarly the 
board has evicted families for damages caused by their children when it appeared that the 
families, despite their best efforts, could not control what their children would do. 
From an analytic perspective the board's discretion to determine the conditions under 
which Mrs. Park could stay seems stronger, in the sense of being less law bound, than its 
discretion to determine whether she should be allowed to stay subject to conditions (cf. Dworkin, 
1978). The law provided no guidance to the board members a s  they creatively sought to 
determine arrangements that would prevent Mrs. Park from posing a fire hazard, but in deciding 
whether Mrs. Park should be allowed to stay despite her actions the board was constrained by its 
need to respect the goals of the lease clauses Mrs. Park was shown to have violated. 
This analytic distinction, however, makes no sense from a behavioral perspective. The two 
determinations cannot be separated, for it is the board's creativity in establishing conditions that 
determines whether it can allow a tenant to stay while still respecting the goals of the lease 
provisions that it is called on to enforce. Discretion is often intertwined in this way, and efforts to 
limit or extend discretion of one analytically distinct sort may aff'ect how discretion of another 
analytically distinct sort is exercise. Thus Heumann and Loftin found that the Michigan 
legislature's effort to prevent judges from sentencing gun carrying criminals to less than two years 
in prison affected the changing discretion of prosecutors and the discretion that judge had to accept 
or reject plea bargains (Loftin et  al., 1983). It is for similar reasons that Abel (1982) and others 
23 I was told in a letter by one board member that several months after the case I observed, Mrs. 
Park again let her beans burn, was brought before the board, and was this time'evicted. The " 
incident may have happened because the stove had not been removed or disconnected, or because 
Mrs. Park had impermissibly reconnected her stove, or because Mrs. Park found a way to burn 
her beans in a microwave. My correspondent did not tell me. 
argue that the institution of informal justice may extend state control. When police or prosecutors 
have the discretion to refer disputes to institutions of informal justice, they may pursue matters 
that they would have discretionarily dropped had pursuing the matter necessarily placed it in 
formal court. Those who focus on the discretion that inheres in rules may miss important ways 
that discretion constrains and frees choices if they don't consider individual rules as parts of 
applied rule systems. 
The board's other discretionary decision, the decision about whether there has been a lease 
violation in the first instance, is, of the decisions entrusted to the board, the one most closely 
confined by law. In reaching this decision, the board members are to examine the facts and 
determine whether they make out a lease violation. From a legal-analytic perspective this narrow 
task may nonetheless involve substantial judgmental discretion, since the factual determination 
may be quite difficult, and lease provisions may require interpretation. 
From a behavioral standpoint, however, the situation is different. The fact of the lease 
violation in Mrs. Park's case appeared so unproblematic that the board in its discussion did not 
even address the issue. Rather the members turned immediately to the question of whether there 
were any conditions under which the woman could be allowed to remain without posing a threat to 
her neighbors. In the eviction setting this is almost always the case. Lease violations are 
ordinarily clear,24 and the board has no discretion, except in the sense that, a s  in the Teofilo case, 
they may ignore the law, to find otherwise. Thus, what is conceptually a major locus for the 
exercise of board discretion is behaviorally almost never the occasion for discretionary decision 
making. The question whether there has been a lease violation seldom merits discussion. 
The case of Mrs. Park reveals one other way in which the board's discretion is affected 
and, in effect, limited. In this case, the DAG, despite the manager's position to the contrary, did 
not seek eviction. Rather he participated with th'e board members and Mrs. Park's lawyer in a 
24 The one rare exception is in the occasional case involving troublesomk behavior where different 
witnesses may present different stores about an event (e.g. who started a fight) or the Authority 
may have difficulty in finding credible witnesses to testify to the defendant tenant's misdeeds. 
discussion of arrangements that would remove the threat of a fire yet still allow Mrs. Park to cook 
her beans, and he concluded the Authority's case by stating: 
If the board feels that there has been sufficient corrective actions ... then I would 
see no problem with some kind of conditional deferment that there be no further 
forgetfulness of boiling beans down or whatever. Some type of condition; that is 
what I would recommend. Let her stay on probation. 
This prosecutorial concession further limited the board's discretion. While the board might have 
decided to let Mrs. Park stay even if the prosecutor had sought her eviction, when the prosecutor 
is willing to accept a conditional deferment, the board a s  a behavioral matter is unlikely to offer 
less. The point applies generally. In an adversary system whatever the discretion of the decision 
maker, a party is unlikely to do worse than the opposing party requests.25 Thus, the board did 
not seriously consider the motion of one member to evict Mrs. Park. Had the p r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t o r ' s  
concession not been made, the motion certainly would have divided the board and might well have 
carried. 
The Cases of the Tenants Who Owed Rent -- Par t  I 2 6 
Mrs. A, a woman of about 35, owes $300.00, or a little more than two months back rent. 
She appears before the eviction board with three children, all under six years of age, in tow. After 
the board chair introduces himself and the board members, Mrs. A is told the cause of action and 
25 There are exceptions such as jbries that give a plaintiff greater damages than his lawyer 
sought or a judge who imposes a stiffer sentence than a prosecutor requested. However, these 
exceptions are empirically rare occurrences. The plea bargaining system, for example, could not 
work if judges insisted on more severe sentences than those agreed to by prosecutors, and 
rejections of civil settlements are almost unheard of even in class actions where judges have a 
special obligation to consider the interests of the plaintiff class as a whole. 
26 The prior cases are based on actual transcripts of cases I observed. The cases under this head . 
are composites and so are described in the present tense as  they might appear to an observer 
attending the hearing. No one case exactly fits the descriptions which follow, but these cares are 
as  typical as  any I might offer of the kinds of cases involving non-payment of rent that the 
eviction board hears. The quotations I use are not composites, they are taken from transcripts, 
although some extraneous material has been eliminated and portions have been rendered more 
grammatical than in their spoken form. 
asked whether she is willing to proceed without counsel (which she agrees to do). She and the 
project manager, who will report on her payment history, are placed under oath. 
The Authority's prosecutor, in this case the SPHM, lets the project manager present the 
details of the Authority's case. He reports that Mrs. A has often been late with her rent and that 
about three months before the hearing she stopped paying entirely. Three notices to speak with 
him were ignored, and he didn't find her home on two occasions when he went to her house. Two 
weeks before the hearing, shortly after she was subpoenaed to appear, Mrs. A came to the project 
office and paid $120.00, but $300.00 on a monthly rent of $140.00 is still outstanding. 
At this point Mrs. A is asked if she wishes to make a statement. She explains that she got 
behind in her rent when she fell on some stairs and injured her back. To get treatment she had to 
spend her rent money on doctors' bills. She also says that she lost time from her york in a candy 
factory, and that she had to spend the first paycheck that she received when she got back on food. 
The manager interrupts to say that two years before when Mrs. A fell behind on her rent she also 
said that she injured her back, and he reminds the board that during the period when Mrs. A was 
supposedly home from work with her back injury, he went to her unit twice to talk to her but she 
wasn't in. The board doesn't know whether to believe Mrs. A's story or not. 
The board chair then takes control of the discussion. He asks Mrs. A where Mr. A is. She 
explains that she was divorced more than two years ago. He then asks whether Mr. A pays child 
support. She replies that he left the island after the divorce and that she cannot locate him. At 
this point the chair asks her whether she wants to stay in public housing. Mrs. A replies that she 
does because she doesn't know .where else she and her children can live. Another member asks 
whether she has considered welfare. She replies that she gets food stamps, but that with her job 
her income is above the AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) cut off. The chair asks 
her whether, if she is allowed to stay in housing, she could manage to pay her current rent as  it 
accrued and pay an extra $50.00 a month on her debt. She replies that she could. The chair then 
reminds her that next to food for her children, rent must be her highest priority. Mrs. A nods her 
agreement. She is then excused, and the board retires to deliberate. 
\ 
After a quick and almost perfunctory deliberation, spiced only by some discussion of 
whether Mrs. A really did injure her back, the board returns, and the chair tells Mrs. A that they 
have voted to evict her (Mrs. A looks crestfallen) but that they have deferred the execution of the 
order and that Mrs. A can stay in housing if she keeps her rent current and pays an extra $50.00 
a month until her back charges are paid off. (Mrs. A looks relieved and happy.) The chair further 
explains that should she not stick to this payment schedule, the manager will report back to the 
board and they will order her evicted immediately without another chance to be heard. He 
concludes by wishing her good luck, and she thanks the board members for giving her a second 
chance. The manager looks disgruntled but unsurprised a s  he leaves. 
The next day the project manager complains to another manager that although he could 
not prove it, he thinks that Mrs. A was vacationing on another island with a male friend during 
the two weeks she claimed to be away from work with her injury. At least this is what a neighbor 
told him she was doing on one of the occasions when he called on Mrs. A and found that she 
wasn't home. He didn't mention this to the board, he tells his friend, because his evidence was 
only hearsay and he didn't think the board would buy it. His fellow manager sympathizes and 
they both agree that cases like Mrs. A's cost the Authority oodles of money.27 
Mrs. B's case was exactly like Mrs. A's case except that she went to the project office and 
paid the $300.00 she owed five days before the hearing. The case was cancelled. If Mrs. B. fell 
behind on her rent sometime during the next six months, she would again be summoned to appear 
before the board and she, no doubt, would be allowed to pay off her rent debt over time. If Mrs. A 
should miss a rent payment or an installment payment during the next six months, she would, if 
the manager brought the default to the board's attention, find that the board voted to execute the 
deferred order, and she would be evicted. 
27 My research reveals that the managers are wrong if by this they mean that the Authority's 
losses when conditionally deferred tenants fall deeper in debt exceed its gains when such tenants 
pay off all or part of what they owe (Lempert, 1972). The Authority reached conclusions similar 
to mine when, in 1979, it examined the effect of eviction'board deferrals on- subsequent.rent 
collections. I cannot, however, say whether the managers are wrong if they mean to make the 
general deterrence argument that knowledge of board leniency means that some tenants who 
would otherwise pay their rent on time do not do so. 
The board is clearly not exe'rcising discretion in the case of Mrs. B, for it did not hear her 
case. However, as  we shall see when we look a t  the case of Mrs. Y in the next section, the 
Authority need not have cancelled Mrs. B's hearing. There is an important point here which, 
perhaps because it is so obvious, is often missed in studies of adjudicative discretion. This is that 
the discretion of an adjudicator is typically constrained by the discretion exercised by others, which. 
in turn shapes the observer's perceptions of how discretion is exercised. 
Mrs. B's case is extreme. Because the Authority chose to drop the case once the lease 
violation was cured, the board had no occasion to decide whether a cured lease violation might 
merit a probationary sentence or some other sanction. Other instances are less extreme in that 
the adjudicator reaches a decision, but possible decisions are foreclosed by the discretionary 
determinations of others. Thus, when the project manager did not mention the information he 
received from Mrs. A's neighbor, the board could not base a decision on this information even, if 
they would have believed the hearsay and been prepared to evict for such irresponsible 
behavior.28 More generally, as  I have already pointed out, it is usually the case that in an 
adversary system the adjudicator is constrained to be no more severe on a party than the party's 
opponent demands. 
Mrs. A's case, unlike Mrs. B's, appears to involve discretion of a far ranging sort. Mrs. A 
violated her lease agreement and could legally have been evicted for that violation. The law, 
however, does not demand this result but leaves it to the board's discretion. Moreover, nothing 
about the law suggests that if Mrs. A is to be allowed to stay it should be on the condition that she 
repay her rent a t  the rate of $50.00 per month. Yet despite this rule-granted discretion, if we 
look at the way the board actually makes decisions, we find that the board does not see itself as 
having much choice. 
28 In one case a woman told the board that she had taken several months' rent money (which I 
expect was from welfare) and gone to the outer islands on vacation. She said that she had been 
too poor ever to leave Oahu; that she was happy that she had chosen to spend her rent money in 
this way, and that she was prepared to live with the consequences. The board evicted her, but the 
members who had voted to evict remembered the woman with fondness. They admired both her 
integrity in admitting what she had done and the spirit which led her to want to see something 
more of the world. 
Indeed, the decision to allow Mrs. A to stay on the condition that she repay her rent hardly 
involved a choice a t  all, for a t  the time of Mrs. A's case (which is based on observations I made in 
1969) the board virtually never evicted a tenant who owed rent and claimed to be able to clear 
that debt. Instead eviction was voted but, as  with Mrs. A, the execution of the order was stayed 
on the condition that the tenant keep current and pay off the accrued debt. By 1969 this practice 
had been routine for nearly a decade. 
During the period when this practice of always deferring was being established, which is to 
say a t  the outset of the independent board's existence, the board may well have regarded each 
case as  an occasion for the exercise of discretion in that it may seriously have considered the facts 
of each non-payment case and may have decided each action without feeling that its decision was 
preordained. Yet the decisions were invariably the same: the tenant was put on conditions and 
allowed, a t  least for the moment, to stay. But any sense of discretion receded over time as  
precedent developed, so that an immediate eviction in circumstances like Mrs. A's was almost 
unthinkable. I found evidence for the development of precedent in the transcripts that were 
available for.56 non-payrnent cases heard during the board's first two years of existence. The 
correlation between case order and transcript length a s  measured in lines is -.538, meaning that 
the more non-payment cases the board had heard, the less time, on the average, it took to dispose 
of new ones. Such a negative correlation is to be expected if what were once discretionary 
decisions, which required an in depth investigation of circumstance, became routine, meaning that 
there was less to talk about.29 
Students of discretion often argue that officials with discretion, particularly low level 
decision makers like police, prosecutors, and trial judges, generally seek to maximize their 
29 The negative correlation does not appear to be due to a generalized experiential effect. For 
fifteen income violation cases that the board heard over the same time period, the correlation 
between transcript length and case order is an insignificant .031 which differs from the similar 
correlation for non-payment cases a t  the .05 level. Income violation cases often involved disputed 
allegations about whether tenants -had properly reported their entire family earnings and, if not, 
whether they had innocently misunderstood their responsibility. Of course, had the board 
confronted as  many income violations as it did non-payment cases, the board might have 
developed discretion-limiting precedent in such cases a s  well. 
discretion. The argument may be correct but only in one sense of the word discretion; that is, the 
"authority" or "fmality" sense Oworkin, 1978). This we have seen may involve "legal" or 
authorized discretional,'but it may also be a situational discretion, such as  that enjoyed by the'cop 
on the beat, to ignore the law. Observing the eviction board suggests that the opposite 
phenomenon also occurs. Where a decision making body has legal discretion, it may act to 
minimize its discretion, that is, to limit the discretion that it must and, eventually, can exercise. 3 0 
Familiarity, as  Joe Sanders and I argue elsewhere, breeds precedent (Lempert and Sanders, 1986; 
cf. Schauer, 1987), and a precedent for interpreting facts may be every bit as  powerful as  
precedential pronouncements of law.3 Thus, there were cases I observed in which board 
members were suspicious of a tenant's story or felt that the tenant's prospects of repaying her 
rent debt were poor, yet nonetheless voted to defer eviction because that was the way non- . 
payment cases were handled. Assuming the situation of the HHA's eviction board is not unique, 
we may expect to find that decision makers with discretion routinely act so as  to limit their 
discretion as  a behavioral matter. Those that do not, such as  the United States Supreme Court or 
the eviction board when it is considering a family accused of fighting, do not hear large numbers of 
factually similar cases.32 1 shall expand on these points later. 
In non-payment cases the eviction board exercises greater discretion in'deciding the 
conditions under which a deferment should be given then in deciding whether to give a deferment. 
This is not surprising since cases differ substantially in the size of accrued debts, the reasons for 
30 Individual decision makers, no doubt, do the same,.but the mechanism involves not the 
establishment of protocols or routines such that alternatives to the routine precedential disposition 
are not consciously considered (Emerson, 1984). 
Ultimately a precedent for interpreting facts is hard to distinguish from a rule of law, or the 
factual interpretation matter because it entails specific invariant legal consequences. 
32 What is factually similar depends, of course, on how closely one looks a t  different cases 
(Lempert and Sanders, 1986). The Supreme Court chooses to look quite closely a t  those cases it 
accords full hearings. Where it examines such large numbers of cases that it cannot look closely 
a t  them, a s  a t  the certiorari stage, rules of thumb develop which systematically and predictably 
cut down on the scope of exercised discretion even though the Court has the authority to hear 
what cases it will. The primary rules seem to be a strong presumption against granting certiorari 
unless one of a small number of conditions are met (Tanenhaus et al., 1963). 
them, and the ability of tenants to repay what they owe over time. Indeed, in the 1960s much of 
the hearing time was devoted to determining the resources available to the tenant and the 
conditions under which the tenant's accrued rent debts could be paid. Again, however, the image 
of an adjudicator exercising authorized discretion by using its judgment to reach a wise decision is 
misleading. What we have instead is what might be called "cooperative discretion." Although 
Mrs. A a s  a legal matter had no say over the conditions that were set for her continued 
occupancy, a s  a practical matter she considerably influenced the board's decision because the 
board realized that there was no point in setting conditions that Mrs. A could not meet. Thus the 
board negotiated with her over the terms to be set, and used its discretion to confirm the results of 
the negotiation. 
This is a phenomenon rarely noticed by students of discretion, but one which is not 
unusual. People with discretionary authority can be expected to negotiate with and be influenced 
by those over whom they are supposed'to exercise discretion. Moreover, the eviction board 
example suggests that this does not just occur in situations such a s  the typical plea bargain where 
the object of discretion has something to offer the adjudicator, like a speedier disposition of the 
case. Rather it depends on the goals the decision maker seeks to achieve. Since the eviction board 
that heard Mrs. A's case wanted it to end with Mrs. A remaining in housing and the Authority 
made whole, they wanted a solution which she thought would make this feasible. Regulatory 
officials, like water pollution inspectors, for example, engage in similar negotiations with those 
who are subject to their discretion (Hawkins, 1984), and some students of regulation have argued 
that such negotiations are not only common (Winter, 1985) but desirable (Scholz, 1984). 
The C a s e W t  -- P a U  
Mrs. X's case is like that of Mrs. A. She is charged with the same offense, she owes the 
same amount of money, and she offers the same reasons for falling behind on her rent. She fell 
down the stairs, hurt her back, had medical bills, and lost time from work. However, a t  her 
hearing the Authority's prosecutor is not the SPHM, but a lawyer who devotes almost all his time 
to the eviction process, and this lawyer, not the board chair, dominates the proceedings. Mrs. X's 
story does differ from Mrs. A's in a few particulars. The $120.00 paid before the hearing.was 
paid not a t  the project office but a t  a bank, and Mrs. X has a bank receipt which she brings to the 
hearing. No board member asks about Mr. X, for they presume there is no Mr. X, nor is Mrs. X 
asked whether she can manage time payments. Both the and the board question her. 
She is asked about whether she receives aid from welfare and about whether she has any sources 
from which she can borrow money to pay off the debt. She tells about her food stamps and says 
that maybe she can get some money from her mother but that her mother isn't too well off either. 
After Mrs. X has told her story and answered some questions, the prosecutor summarizes 
the situation: 
O.K. let me explain. What happens here is usually everybody is treated pretty 
much the same before the board. Usually when somebody comes in here and they 
owe rent, we ask for an eviction from the board, and if you can get the money 
together and take care of everything then you can file an appeal. If by the time 
you put in the appeal you have everything paid off -- zero balance -- nothing owed 
-- then usually the Commission that runs the housing authority will look a t  that 
and in general they will let you stay. So if you can borrow, like you said you could 
from your mother, and pay off the debt, it usually works out.33 
llROsemary,ll the prosecutor then says, turning to the project manager, "Do you have any 
other recommendations than that?" 
"No," says the manager, "eviction without conditions. I talked to her several times and 
told her that her best chance would be to get a zero balance by the time she came here. She had 
some time to get the money together but except for that $120.00 there has been no payment, so 
eviction without conditions is what I'm asking for." 
33 This question and those that followed are taken from hearings that I obsemed and tape 
recorded. Some grammatical corrections have been made and all names have been changed. 
The prosecutor then asks the board whether they have any questions. One member asks 
Mrs. X whether the candy factory where she works has a credit union she might borrow from, 
and she answers that she already owes them $800.00. Another member lectures her for not 
going to the manager when she hurt herself and explaining her problem. 
The board then retires to deliberate. The discussion is even quicker and more perf;nctory 
than in the case of Mrs. A. Indeed, the members soon turn to small talk about their private 
activities because they do not want to give Mrs. X the impression that they have not genuinely 
considered her case. After about eight minutes, they send for the parties. 
The chair explains to Mrs. X that because of her rent debt the board has voted to evict 
her. The chair adds, however, that it will take several weeks to get the eviction papers in order, 
and that if during that period she can come up with the money to pay everything she owes, she 
will have the "new facts and evidence" needed to appeal to the HHA's Board of Commissioners. 
In these circumstances, he says, the Commissioners are "more than likely" to allow you to stay. 
If she has any questions about how to appeal, she is told to bring the eviction papers to the project 
manager along with a bank receipt showing that she has paid off her debt, and the managei- will 
tell her what needs to be done. 
Mrs. Y's case is like Mrs. X's except that she, like Mrs. B, cleared her debt five days 
before the hearing. However, unlike Mrs. B, Mrs. Y's hearing is not cancelled. 
I 
Mrs. Y's case takes less time than Mrs. X's. After the "due process" preliminaries, the 
prosecutor checks with the project manager to make sure the entire rent debt has been paid and 
that the Mrs. Y currently enjoys a zero balance. He briefly ascertains the cause of her rental 
delinquency and her intention to keep up with her rent in the future. As if to justify bringing Mrs. 
Y before the board, he adds, "Well, you can't be delinquent because the federal government is 
really down on us to make sure that we make everybody pay on time. It isn't just the state, it is 
the federal government too." He then asks the project manager whether the tenant is otherwise a 
- good tenant and when she says that there have been no other problems, he recommends that the 
family be allowed to stay but put on six months' probation through a conditional deferment. The 
manager expresses her agreement with this disposition, and the prosecutor invites the board to 
ask questions. They briefly go over the reasons for Mrs. Y's delinquency and then retire to 
deliberate. When they return the board chair says: 
Mrs. Y, the board has decided on an eviction, but with conditions. In other words, 
an eviction order is deserved but it is held back, not given to you, but you have to 
comply with a couple of conditions. One is that beginning this month, you pay the 
rent on time, within the first seven days of each month, and you verify the 
payment with the receipt, go to the office, within the very next day, 24 hours.34 
Do both of these for six months and then the eviction order is dissolved and 
everything is O.K.. Do you understand? 
The prosecutor reiterates the conditions. He emphasizes that not only must Mrs. Y pay 
her rent on time, but she must bring her payment receipt from the bank to the project office the 
day after she pays (the "verification" requirement). The case concludes with a pleasant 
interchange between the prosecutor and tenant: 
Mrs. Y: Thank you very much. 
Pros.: Good luck. 
Mrs. Y: Have a good day. 
The cases of A and B differ from those of X and Y in one important particular. The first 
two cases were heard in 1969 while the latter arose in 1987. In the case of Mrs. B, the board had 
no discretion, for her case was never brought to the board. In the cases of A, Y, and X, however, 
the board had essentially the same authority to choose among various outcomes. The board that 
heard Mrs. A's case could have evicted her and relegated her to a right to appeal. The board that 
heard Mrs. X's case could have allowed her to stay on the condition that she pay off her rental 
debt in $50.00 monthly installments. And in the case of Mrs. Y, the board might have decided 
34 The official reason for this is so the manager will learn whether the rent has been paid without 
waiting for the computer printout that reports rental payments five days after the due date. Thus 
if the rent is not paid when due, eviction proceedings can start  imme'diately. I t  also is an 
inconvenience that penalizes the tenant for her delinquency and may be a reminder to the tenant 
that she must pay her rent on time. 
that there was no cause for an  eviction order since no money was owing a t  the time of the 
hearing. 
While the decisions in'the cases of X and Y were quite different from the decision in the 
case of A, the board in these cases was not exercising greater discretion. Indeed, the board's 
decision making was so perfunctory that the prosecutor of Mrs. X and Mrs. Y could tell them 
during the hearing what the outcome was going to be, just a s  the prosecutor of Mrs. A could have 
done had he so chosen.35 Thus the cases of X and Y provide further evidence of self-limiting 
discretion. The board, which had the legal authority to choose among a wide variety of outcomes, 
acted as if it had virtually no discretion in the cases that it most commonly faced. 
But, a s  I shall discuss in more detail later, the choice of how to be bound is itself a 
discretionary act. We see this when we compare the cases of A and X. In 1969 the board, 
, . 
whatever its opinion of Mrs. A, felt that it had no "discretion" to evict her. In 1987, on facts 
identical in all important respects, the board felt that it had no choice but to evict. 
Philosophers, we saw a t  the outset.of this paper, commonly define discretion in terms of 
legal authority or, to be more precise, in terms of freedom from the constraints that legal 
authority imposes. Discretion involves an authorized freedom of choice. From a behavioral 
perspective this conception translates not into freedom to decide as  one will, but into the freedom 
to be influenced by factors other than the law. The example of the eviction board suggests that 
such non-legal influences may be strong enough and pervasive enough that a pattern of legally 
discretionary decisions may be as  predictable and as  rigidly tied to a few key facts as the decision 
patterns generated by adjudicators consciously applying specific and detailed legal commands. 
Indeed, a body with discretion may not only act as  if its hands are tied, but it may come to believe 
that this is the case. 
35 In the period between 1960 and 1969 only about 5% of non-payment cases resulted in 
immediate eviction. In 1987 I saw one of perhaps twelve tenants who came before the board 
owing money put on conditions. Both the'prosecutor and board members told me that this was the 
first time in about a year that any non-payment tenant owing money had been put on conditions. 
These observations lead to two final questions that should be addressed in an effort to 
understand discretion from a behavioral perspective. The first is when is a legal mandate strong 
. . enough to foreclose adjudicative choice? The second is how do extra-legal factors come to constrain 
the decisions of the adjudicators vested with legal discretion? The questions are obviously related, 
for the influence of the law will vary inversely with the influence of extralegal factors, and vice 
versa. For this'reason a law that will strongly influence the decisions of some legal actors may 
have little or no influence on the behavior of other such actors. Thus the prohibition against illegal 
searches and seizures in the United States Constitution may lead most judges to discard certain 
types of evidence although it might not prevent most police officers from acquiring it. 
The case study of the eviction board does not provide great insights into the question of 
what makes a law influential, and I doubt if what it does tell us adds much to existing learning. 
First, the mandate and clarity of the law as  understood by the decision maker seem important. 
Before 1980, the statute establishing the eviction board did not require the board to evict simply 
because it found a violation, and the board developed a pattern of not evicting. One of several 
amendments passed in 1980 could arguably have been interpreted a s  mandating eviction 
whenever a lease violation was found, but it does not clearly require this and the Authority has 
not so interpreted it. Indeed, in training sessions both before and after the passage of the 1980 
amendments board members were told that their discretion extended to withholding eviction even 
if they found lease violations, and for five years after the passage of the amendments the board 
sometimes did this. 
The board has, however, almost always complied where a legal mandate appeared clear. 
Thus, T h e s e  t t h e  was a unique act of rebellion against the law. In other 
cases the board has regretfully evicted tenants who were over the income ceiling, citing federal 
law that required such tenants to move within six months of the over income determination. In 
similar fashion the board beginning in the mid-1970s limited the period over which tenants were 
allowed to repay their rent to six months because they were told that that was the limit which 
federal law provided for the repayment of back charges. Tenants who had no prospects of 
repaying their rent debts in six months were evicted. 3 6 
A related factor which affects the binding power of law on an adjudicator is his role 
conception. An attitude toward the binding nature of statutory language and precedent is usually 
an important aspect of judicial role conception. The eviction board members are somewhat similar 
to a jury in the way they define their role. The members feel that they are to exercise common 
sense judgment but that in doing so they are bound by the law. Thus if board members believe a 
particular action is legally required, they comply. It follows that one way to affect the board's 
exercise of discretion is to convince them that certain actions are or are not legally permissible. 
A major difference between the board and a jury is that board members serve sufficiently 
lengthy terms that some come to feel that they are experts on what the law requires. For 
example, in one case I observed in 1987 the prosecutor erred slightly in making his customary 
speech. Rather than telling the tenant that the board's usual procedure in cases like hers was to 
evict, he suggested that the law gave the board no choice but to evict. The board chair, who had 
served for about a decade, interrupted the prosecutor to emphasize that the board had discretion to 
refuse eviction regardless of its usual practice. In a later case this chair's panel granted a tenant 
a conditional deferment despite an outstanding rent debt, the first time in almost a year that they 
had been lenient in this fashion. One member commented jokingly that it must have been my 
influence. He may have been right. In questioning board members about their usual practice and 
changes in it over time, I reminded them of their discretion to defer evictions despite rent that was 
outstanding and of the fact that they once exercised it. 
The board is like a jury, however, in that the salience of other values affects the law's 
actual binding authority. The Case of the House that Burned illustrates this. The Teofilos' 
36 It is not clear that the law was correctly interpreted for the board since the provision in 
question specifically addressed the time that a tenant whose rent had been inappropriately set 
would have to repay the difference between the proper rent and the rent actually paid rather than 
the time a tenant would have to repay a debt accumulated by defaulting on the proper rent. 
situation induced so much sympathy and respect that the board refused to evict despite their 
understanding that this was what the law required. I observed a similar conflict in 1987, except 
that strongly held sentiments clashed not with the demands of external law but with the 
requirements of the board's by then well-established precedent. The case in which this occurred 
was a non-payment action involving a divorced woman, let us call her Mrs. Sua, with ten children. 
Mrs. Sua had not cleared her debt by the time of the hearing but said that she expected to soon 
receive a special welfare grant to pay it. In 1967 or 1977 the board would have deferred eviction 
on the condition that the debt be paid by a certain date; in 1987 the board regularly evicted on 
such facts, relegating the tenant to her right to appeal. In Mrs. Sua's case the board did neither. 
Rather it continued the case for two weeks to allow the woman to secure her grant without the 
stress of an outstanding eviction order and the need to proceed through an appek that would have 
made her vulnerable to an eviction without a hearing for the slightest defalcation over the ensuing 
twelve months. In the DAGYs judgment the woman's large family was the factor that led to this 
special treatment. Judges are supposed to be better able than lay decision makers to ignore 
personal values when these clash with legal interpretations. Perhaps they are, but judges too 
balance the importance of the values affected by their decisions with their understanding of what 
law or consistent practice requires. 
zed Dlscretmn 
Since the law as  understood by the eviction board members gave the board considerable 
leeway in deciding how to dispose of cases, our investigation can address the second question, 
which asks what shapes the exercise of authorized or rule-given discretion. One important factor 
is that when a decision maker is repeatedly confronted with cases of a particular type there is a 
tendency toward what Prof. Sanders and I call "shallow" decision making (Lempert and Sanders, 
1986). That is, there is a tendency to eschew a deep probing of circumstances and to rely instead 
on a few key facts that can be used to fit cases to stereotypes.37 There are no doubt many 
reasons for this, including psychological r n e c h a n i ~ m s ~ ~  and the efficiency that routine processing 
allows. This tendency is complemented by a common element of judicial role conceptions, the 
sense that, regardless of the range of outcomes that discretion allows, cases that are similar in 
relevant particulars should be decided in the same way. Thus we can expect adjudicators to see 
cases as  similar on the basis of a few particulars and to dispose of cases that are seen a s  similar 
in a similar fashion. 
As a consequence adjudicators who have discretion to decide a series of similar cases will 
generate a pattern of decisions which is sufficiently regular to call into question the actuality of 
their di~cretion.~'  Indeed, it may be, as  was apparently the case with the eviction board, that 
adjudicators with broad discretion to decide will feel in most cases that their decisions are tightly 
constrained despite their knowledge of the leeway law gives them. Thus to understand how 
extralegal factors come to constrain the decisions of those vested with discretion, we must explore 
those conditions that lead an adjudicator to feel that cases of a certain type should systematically 
be decided in one way or another. 
In the case of the eviction board, the predominant factdr leading to the early precedent of 
never ordering a n  immediate eviction may have been the values that the original board members 
brought to their work. The original five-person board included a social worker. and a minister 
among its members and was dominated by a chair who did considerable volunteer work on behalf 
37 The tendency applies to judges in general, but is not confined to them. Other examples include 
insurance adjusters (Ross, 1970), public defenders (Sudnow, 1965), private defense counsel 
(Skolnick, 1967), and prosecutors (Maynard, 1984). 
38 See the discussion of the "representativeness heuristic" in Nisbett and Ross (1980, pp. 24-28; 
cf. Fromrn, 1965). 
39 This is not to call into question the existence of rule-granted discretion, nor is it necessarily to 
call into question the phenomenological reality of discretion. Rather it is to suggest that for 
practical purposes the adjudicator appears to be acting without discretion, and one who did not 
know the rule but only observed behavior might reasonably think that the law did not authorize 
discretion and that  the adjudicator in acting had no sense of exercising any. In'fact, I believe that 
adjudicators who act in the way described in the text often will have the sense that they lack 
discretion, but a sense of being without discretion is not entailed by behaviorally regular decision 
making. 
of the poor. Moreover, in establishing the independent board, the Authority conveyed the 
impression that special sensitivity to the interests of the poor was appropriate. The choice of 
members reflected the notion that the impoverished tenants were a constituency with interests 
that deserved representation. 
In addition, the Authority's original prosecutor was untroubled by leniency in cases where 
it appeared that tenants would be able to repay their rent. The members' natural sympathies 
coupled with their difficulty in deciding which of the tenants who promised to pay back their rent 
could be believed fostered the development of a precedent that allowed all tenants who said they 
would pay back their rent a second chance.40 
Other factors also contributed tg this outcome. One was probably the desire of board 
members to avoid the responsibility for evicting tenants with innocent young children,. even when 
the parents' failure to pay rent was blameworthy. The strategy of deferring eviction placed the 
responsibility back on the tenant. For tenants had their eviction deferred only if they promised to 
repay their rent. If they then failed, they were not only shirking their responsibility, but were 
also breaking their word, and the subsequent eviction could easily be seen as  their own doing 
rather than a s  the result of the board members' refusal to accept the sympathy-inducing story 
they were likely to have heard a t  the initial hearing. Moreover, the board members would not 
have to confront the tenant again, but would take the Authority's word that conditions were not 
being met and would vote to execute the deferred order.41 
The forces that establish a precedent are not necessarily those that keep it in motion.42 
Members, like a retired project manager, who joined the board with neither an inclination to 
40 Where the wisdom of a discretionary decision will be validated by another's (or even an 
object's) hard to predict future behavior, discretion is likely to be abdicated in favor of rules of 
thumb or, as is the case with many college admissions officers and parole boards, in favor of 
mathematical formulae. I am indebted to my colleague Carl Schneider to calling my attention to 
the general importance of "subject unpredictability" in his comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
41 This changed in 1975 with an informal ruling by the Attorney General's Office that deferred. 
tenants who did not meet their rent payment conditions were entitled to a hearing before the 
eviction order could be executed. 
sympathesize with financially troubled tenants nor an optimistic view of their prospects for 
repaying their debts nonetheless respected board precedent and voted to defer eviction despite 
their doubts. Other factors also served to keep the precedent alive. One was the appointment of a 
"bleeding heart" (the managers' term) board chair in the mid 1960s who served for 16 years. As 
chair he dominated the discussion. Moreover as  the years passed and new board members were 
appointed, this chair's experience gave h i  a special claim to expertise about how different types 
of cases should be decided. 
Another factor that may have helped maintain the pattern of lenient decision making is 
the feedback that the board members received during the 1960s and much of the 1970s. When 
the board gave tenants a second chance they were often warmly thanked by the tenants. 
Managers did not thank the board in the cases in which the board evicted, and they usually hid 
the depth of their displeasure when the board failed to evict. The board members also learned 
about what happened after they deferred eviction since they voted to cancel eviction orders when 
debts were cleared or voted to evict or set new conditions if tenants failed to live up to the 
conditions of their initial deferral; More often then not, tenants cleared their debts, and even those 
that didn't often repaid a portion of their debt before again falling behind. Thus the board 
members felt that when they were lenient they were usually right.43 
Finally, the attitude of the Authority officials who prosecuted cases was important, for 
these were the officials who regularly met with the board and presented the Authority's positions. 
The prosecutors during the 1960s and early 1970s not only respected the board's authority but 
were also relatively passive in presenting the Authority's case. While in some cases involving 
4L Joe Sanders made this observation in a conversation many years ago. I have often been 
indebted to him for it. One reason for this, a s  my colleague Fred Schauer (1987) notes, is that the 
values of precedent are logically distinct from the values of precedent. 
43 The board members were correct if the criterion is the Authority's net rent collection 
experience in cases where the board deferred eviction. Even allowing for tenants who did not meet 
the board's conditions and fell deeper in debt before they were evicted, the Authority's losses were 
less in cases where the board set conditions than they would have been had the board evicted 
immediately (to cut the possibility of further loss) in each instance. I discovered this in examining 
data from the 1960s, and a n  internal Authority memorandum tells the same story based on data 
from the mid to late 1970s. 
behavioral violations, like fighting or harboring unauthorized guests, the SPHM or other 
prosecutor might press hard for eviction, in non-payment cases they conveyed the impression that 
it was for the board to decide what was to become of the tenant. Indeed, this was the attitude 
that the Authority's central ofice staff conveyed to the project managers when the managers tried 
to get their superiors to press the.board to evict more often. The staff's attitude was that the 
board was given the power to decide cases as it saw fit, and that the board's pattern of leniency 
was tolerable. One reason for this attitude was that the Authority's prosecutors during the 
1960s, a t  first the HHA's Assistant Executive Director and later in most cases the SPHM, 
devoted relatively little of their attention to evictions. Handling evictions was one duty among 
many, and given the nature of these officials' other responsibilities, their role in managing 
evictions could not have seemed particularly consequential. 
The transformation of this "second chance" pattern to a pattern of always evicting is 
interesting because the transformation required a 180-degree change in precedent. The attempt to 
turn the board around began in 1979, and it took about seven years before the transformation was 
complete. I t  was spurred by the Authority's serious financial troubles,44 by a sense that the 
Authority was losing a substantial amount of money in unpaid rent45 and by the feeling, 
c0nfirmed.b~ HUD auditors, that the Authority's lenient eviction system was largely responsible 
44 At .one point the Authority was labeled by the United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) a "Financially Troubled Housing Authority." KLTD provided operating 
subsidies to the HHA and the HHA had to subject itself to HUD audits and comply with certain 
HUD policies in return. 
45 It  was, however, always recognized that this was not the primary source of the Authority's 
financial troubles. Rather these troubles were due to the HHA's failure to establish adequate 
reserves for maintenance and renovation and a.federa1 subsidy which, because of the formula that 
had been used to calculate it, was inadequate. HUD audits confirmed this diagnosis of the source 
of the Authority's financial troubles even while suggesting that there was a great need to tighten 
the rent collection process. 
for this.46 It also reflected a different, less welfare-oriented attitude a t  the highest levels of the 
HHA toward the task of housing poor tenants. 
In 1979 the HHA, in part responding to pressure from HUD and in part as  a result of its 
own increasingly businesslike (as opposed to welfare) orientation, decided to get its "eviction 
house" in order. There were two basic elements to its strategy. One was to rationalize the 
eviction process and make it more efficient. The second was to transform the board so that it was 
more appreciative of the Authority's concerns and stricter in dealing with non-payment tenants. 4 7 
The effort to rationalize the eviction process began in 1979 with the appointment of an 
administrator whose primary responsibility was to handle eviction actions and the appointment of 
a secretary to devote full time to paperwork of the eviction process. Prior to these appointments 
responsibility for evictions both a t  the secretarial and administrative levels were part time duties 
of staff members who had other tasks that both they and the Authority deemed more important. 
46 I t  appears that the HUD judgment did not reflect their auditor's independent judgment of the 
situation, but instead reflected the field staffs acceptance of the managers' explanation for their 
rent collection problems. The managers, a t  least in 1969, believed that board leniency cost the 
Authority substantial amounts of money, and they shared horror stores about tenants who failed 
to meet board conditions and eventually left or were evicted owing three or four times what they 
had owed a t  the initial hearing. As mentioned in Note 41 above, both my research and an 
Authority investigation reveal that the managers' views about the costs of board leniency were 
wrong. Although there were horror stories, the incremental losses in such cases were more than 
offset by cases in which rent debts were eventually paid in full or where partial repayment 
occurred before further default, so that the tenant when evicted owed less than a t  the initial 
hearing. 
The managers also told a general deterrence story, arguing that knowledge of board 
leniency was common and that this prospect encouraged tenants to fall behind on their rent in the 
first instance. Eventually, I hope to analyze some data that may bear on this, but for the moment 
all I can say is that although the argument sounds plausible, based on what I know of the eviction 
process and the few tenants I talked with, I would be surprised if i t  were true. An argument not 
made by the managers may, however, hold: namely, had the board been very strict and had this 
strictness been publicized a t  the project level, rent collection patterns that were not altered by 
unpublicized board lenience might have been improved. Some data I saw are consistent with this 
hypothesis. In 1986 and 1987 the proportion of tenants behind on their rent is strikingly low a t  
one project. Two of the tenant members of the eviction board reside a t  this project. They told me 
that one or the other goes to every tenant's union meeting and reminds tenants that if they don't 
pay their rent they will be "kicked out." 
47 The reforms were motivated entirely by a concern with nonpayment cases. By 1979 there 
were no income limits on the federally-aided projects, and the board was always more willing to 
evict in behavior cases than in nonpayment cases, so no great problems were seen in this area. 
After the reforms, non-payment cases were given a special priority, so the proportion of cases 
brought for non-payment was somewhat higher in the 1980s than it had been in earlier decades. 
One of the first tasks of the new administrator was to study the eviction process in order 
to respond to HUD's position, which was that the Authority should abolish its eviction board and 
use the ordinary judicial process when it wished to force tenants out. The administrator found, .as 
I had found a decade before, that the eviction board seemed to save the Authority money by 
securing time payments from the majority of those tenants whom the managers (and a court) 
would have immediately evicted. Thus the decision was made to retain the eviction board but to 
increase the efficiency of the eviction process. The major changes are mentioned earlier in this 
paper where I note the differences between the eviction process I studied in 1969 and that which I 
observed in 1987. I will recapitulate briefly. 
First the then existing board was split into two seven-member groups which allowed 
weekly eviction hearings. Second, the HHA drafted and the Hawaiian legislature passed 
amendments to the Act establishing the eviction board that removed a requirement for in-person 
service of process in eviction cases and that limited appeals to the HHA's Commission to cases 
which alleged that relevant "new facts and evidence" had become available 'only following the 
board hearing. Later the Commission delegated the task of determining whether such new facts 
existed to the Authority's executive director, who in turn delegated it to the Director of Housing 
Management (DHM), and it was the DHM's policy never to find new facts and evidence in non- 
payment cases when rent was outstanding. Third, the HHA reformed its system for recording 
rent payments and computerized the process of sending delinquency letters to tenants. Coupled 
with this was close supervision by the SPHM of project delinquencies and instructions to the 
managers to process tenants more quickly for eviction. Before 1980 by the time the board heard 
their cases, tenants were often three months or more behind on their rent. By the mid 1980s, it 
was not uncommon to have a tenant up for eviction six weeks after the initial default. 
While the Authority was revamping its administrative structure in these ways, it was also 
seeking to develop an eviction board that would view cases from the new, stricter perspective it 
had come to prefer. One 'step in this direction was to fill the new slots- that became-available .when 
the board was split in two with people, like private real estate managers, likely to be sympathetic 
to the Authority's point of view. Also, board members were given terms, and a few members who 
were thought to be unduly sympathetic to tenants were not reappointed. The long-time board 
chair was among the first to go. 
A second step the Authority took was to be more specific in its expectations about how the 
board should behave. A training session was held for all board members a t  the time the second 
panel was established, and another one was held several years later. The board members were 
told of the seriousness of the rental delinquency problem which the Authority faced, and their task 
was defined in neutral, judicial terms rather than from the welfare-oriented perspective of how 
best to help tenants. Later the chairs of the board's two panels were sent a t  the Authority's 
expense to "judge's school" in Reno, Nevada, to further encourage them in a legalistic approach. 
Complementing these formal actions were attempts a t  informal influence. The Authority's 
Executive Director and his assistant occasionally attended board parties48 or otherwise chatted 
informally with board members. On these occasions they discussed the Authority's rent 
delinquency prbblems and their expectations about how the board should act, and they 
complimented board members for acting in accord with their expectations. 
Even after these steps had been taken, however, the Authority was not insisting on 
immediate evictions in all cases in which tenants owed money. Rather board members were given 
discretion to allow tenants up to six months of time payments to clear accumulated debts. 
However, the changes in board composition and in the rigor of prosecution had its effect. The 
board evicted many people outright including some who owed no rent when they appeared before 
the board, but had histories of chronic delinquency.49 
48 Board members are paid a largely symbolic ten dollars per meeting attended. Rather than 
collect the money themselves, they pool it and twice a year hold parties. 
49 Between October 1979 and December 1985, 12.7% of those owing nothing a t  the time they 
appeared before the board were evicted as  were 24.6% of those owing one to three months' rent 
and 56.8% of those owing more than three months' rent. Some of those evicted were allowed to 
stay by the HHA's Commissioners on appeal. The figures on board evictions suggest that the 
board may have been exercising genuine discretion in this period. Unfortunately, Iw as not in 
Hawaii then. My interviews suggest that board members who served a t  this time had more of a 
sense that they had real choices to make than did the board members serving in 1987. Clearly 
In about 1985, perhaps coincident with the replacement of the Authority's eviction 
specialist with another attorney, the Authority further toughened its policies. With the 
concurrence of the Executive Director, the DHM decided that the Authority should seek the 
immediate eviction of tenants owing rent a t  the time of the hearing and should place all tenants 
who cle'ared their rent debts between the time they received the subpoena and the hearing on 
50 probation for six months. 
The Authority's Executive Director and its Director of Housing Management may have 
communicated these new expectations to board members, but it was largely left to the HHA's 
eviction specialist, whom I will call C, to cement a new precedent. C may have been particularly 
amenable to this since he did not have experience under the former system, and the new system 
had its own way of allowing tenants to avoid eviction:51 namely, by paying, after the hearing but 
before the time for appeal had lapsed, all the rent that was due.52 Moreover, since the time for 
appeal did not start to run until the tenant was officially notified of the board's decision, C, who 
handled part of the paper work of notification, had some leeway to delay giving notice where he 
thought a tenant could secure money if given extra time. 53 
the rent owing influenced these choices and it may be that a tenant's rent payment history, 
whether good or bad, did as well. Other factors are harder to identify. 
50 If such tenants did not attend the hearing or had records of chronic delinquency, they might be 
evicted. 
51 C began practice as  a legal aid attorney and exercises sympathy for the plight of poor people. 
52 Paying the debt in a lump sum became more feasible a s  the Authority's eviction process grew 
more efficient since tenants often found themselves before the board with less than two months' 
rent owing. At an earlier time when eviction actions were not so speedily commenced many 
tenants who could have managed time payments to clear rent debts of three months and more 
would have found it difficult or impossible to come up with a lump sum to repay their debt. Of 
course, there are still tenants who cannot pay off everything they owe before their time for appeal 
has lapsed who could have paid their rent debt on an  installment plan. 
53 By 1987, however, C claimed the process was so efficient and the backlog of cases so small 
that much of the leeway he once enjoyed was gone. G was also continually pressed to speed up his 
end of the process. The DHM took what he called a "business-like attitude," which some might 
see as  a.hard line toward non-payment tenants. For example, in 1985 the DHM was apparently 
instrumental in getting the Authority to adopt a rule that if a tenant was evicted for non-payment 
of rent she would never again be admitted to an HHA project. Unless this rule has a general 
deterrent effect, it can only cost the Authority money, for evicted tenants seldom repay what they 
C recalls the process of persuading the board to change its decision making standards a s  a 
lengthy and difficult one. I t  took about a year of continually pressing the board to decide cases as  
he wanted -- which is to say to always evict when rent was owing -- and to persuade them that 
this was the right thing to do. Cs strategy was to persuade the board to take a legalistic 
approach and to convince the board members that their vote to evict immediately did not make 
them responsible for a tenant's eviction. G recalls: 
My argument was that the board had to make findings of fact and if the findings of 
act were that the person was delinquent then they had to -- they could give some 
kind of conditional deferment -- however that was more the prerogative of the 
Commission than of the board members. Once they saw that these tenants were 
not going to get evicted for sure just because they said, "Well you're behind and we 
order an eviction". . . the board felt more comfortable in saying, "O.K. we will send 
it on up to the Commission ...." I remember going in there and standing up and 
addressing the board with what their functions were ... [Tlhe selling point was that 
this board wasn't going to be responsible for the people getting thrown out on the 
street, that there was still a safety net .... [Once they saw this] that was probably 
the major reason for.the change. 
In addition, C tried to justify stringency by noting that the welfare of all tenants depended 
on the rents collected and by pointing out that evicted tenants were replaced by equally needy and 
presumptively more responsible tenants from the Authority's waiting list. Themes like this along 
with the "safety net" and "legal duty" points recurredin C s  presentations to the board for as  long 
as held his office.54 
In making his arguments and persuading the board to exercise its discretion to change the 
way in which it routinely decided cases, C benefitted from more than the logical force of what he 
owe unless they seek readmission to an HHA project and are told -- as they once were told -- that 
.:i they are ineligible until their old debts are cleared. 
54 C left for another position in September 1987, shortly after I completed my second stint of field 
work. 
said. First, on each of the boards' panels several members, as  I have pointed out, had been 
chosen because there were likely to by sympathetic to the Authority's position.55 In part for this 
reason the board had since 1980 moved a substantial distance in the direction 51 wanted them to 
go.56 Second, C was a lawyer officially attached to the Hawaii Attorney General's Office and not 
the Housing Authority. Thus he spoke not fully as  a partisan and with considerable legitimate 
authority. Third, he was a repeat player before the board. Every week he addressed the board, 
and he could stress his themes without counter-argument. Tenants usually appeared before the 
board only once, and defense counsel, including legal aid paralegals, were seldom present in non- 
payment case hearings. Thus there was no adversary knowledgeable enough to question C s  
characterization of the board's duties or of the tenant's situation, and no one, other than the more 
experienced board members, to point to the board's historic ability to set conditions. Few tenants 
even knew enough to plead that while they could make time payments, they were unable to pay 
off their debt in one lump sum. Instead, the natural reaction of tenants was to emphasize their 
ability to pay, in the belief that if they could convince the board they could clear their rent debt, 
they would stave off eviction. Thus, "Most people," according to C "would tell the board straight 
out that they are going to get the money together and would pay it." For'C such promises made it 
easier to secure outright evictions, for if such tenants did a s  they promised, they would be allowed 
to stay by the Commission. Thus the tenants' promises to pay distanced the board from 
responsibility for the consequences of its eviction decisions. 
In sum, what we see behind the transformation I have discussed is an adjudicative body 
responding to various pressures to change the way in which it exercised the discretion the law 
accorded it. Behaviorally and phenomenologically, however, the new standard the board developed 
was no more discretionary than the one that existed in 1969. Whereas tenants a t  one time had to 
55 Two members of each panel were tenants who were chosen in consultation with the HHA's 
island-wide tenant association. For reasons that need not be explored here, tenant board members 
were usually disposed to deal severely with tenants brought before them. 
56 The other major factor was that C s  two immediate predecessors had pushed the board for a 
much harder line toward non-payment tenants, although they had not suggested that the board 
always evict those behind in their rent. 
be given a chance to repay their debts over time even if they were poor risks, by 1987 tenants had 
to be evicted if they owed money, even if they were unlikely to meet a lump sum demand but were 
a good bet to clear their debt on an  installment plan. In 1969 members who predicted tenants 
would never pay nevertheless voted to defer their eviction. In 1987, members whose sympathies 
were aroused by tenants voted to evict them.57 The board, in short, possessed throughout the 
period legal discretion to change its standards and it did so, but it never developed a standard that - 
allowed much room for the play of discretion. 
I expect that the discretion of trial judges and other "first instance" adjudicators is often of 
this sort.58 Its operational locus is not where we usually imagine it -- in deciding particular cases; 
rather it is in deciding on a rule to apply in categorizing cases and in deciding how categories of 
cases should be treated (cf. Tweedie, 1989). In so doing, trial judges who have discretion to 
evaluate facts and reach wise judgments, may often be exercising a discretion more akin to that of 
appellate judges. They are, a s  a matter of practice rather than pronouncement, making law for 
the range of cases that come before them, and they are then acting as  if they are without 
discretion; that is as  if they are bound by the law they have made. To understand adjudicative 
discretion one must understand the rules that judges make for themselves. To appreciate how 
discretion is, a s  a behavioral matter, constrained, one must understand the forces that lead judges 
to make particular rules. These forces may not be the same for all courts, and this study of the 
HHAYs eviction board may provide no more than a few general clues. However, any court is likely 
to exist in a context of forces which systematically constrain its so-called discretionary decisions in 
a particular direction. 
57 I witnessed several occasions on which one member, who had just voted to evict a tenant, 
spoke privately to her after she had been informed of the board's decision about ways she might 
acquire money to pay her debt. He even directed some tenants who were not Catholics to his 
Catholic church for help. 
58 The discretion of law-making appellate courts obviously includes the discretion to change 
received standards and create precedent that is presumptively binding even on itself. 
I said a t  the outset of this paper that discretion can be a property of rules, a property of 
behavior or a sense that people have of their freedom to act. Legal philosophers tell us that when 
rules authorize discretion it means that decision makers are free to choose from a range of legally 
permissible options. Yet if we look a t  how adjudicative discretion is actually exercised -- that is a t  
the pattern of decisions generated -- little advantage may be taken of this supposed freedom. 
Although the law leaves open a range of decisions, adjudicators may adopt routine ways of 
disposing of cases that admit of only a few outcomes within that range. Moreover, this is not 
' merely a matter of the mechanics of what routines can generate, for routine ways of disposing of 
cases are easily transformed into subjectively binding precedent. Thus a decision maker with 
legally authorized discretion may lose the awareness of discretion and come to feel that in a 
particular situation a particular decision is required. 
Thus where rules accord a range of discretion to a decision maker, the decision maker may 
be both less and more bound than he appears. The decision maker is less bound because there is 
always discretion to ignore the limitations of the discretion given. Whether this occurs will depend 
both on the decision maker's conception of his role and on the kinds of incentives that shape 
decisions to comply with any rule. Thus the police officer who is bound by law to ticket.a speeding 
motorist may, if no one is watching, pocket a twenty dollar bill and let the motorist go. 
The decision maker with discretion may be more bound than he appears. because he may actually 
feel that this is the case. Thus a police officer authorized by law to stop any motorist going faster 
than 65 miles per hour may never stop any motorist travelling less than 70 miles per hour, and 
he may come to feel that he has no authority to do so, perhaps believing that motorists are 
entitled to a range of grace or that radar guns have a five mlle per hour margin of error. His 
beliefs, however, may have been shaped by motorists who responded with particular hostility 
when they were stopped for barely exceeding the speed limits, by courts that chose to believe 
motorists speed estimates in close-to-the-limit cases, or by fellow officers who mocked him for 
"chicken-shit" arrests. 
What the law gives in discretion -- that is the authorization to reach one of a number of 
possible decisions and the awareness of this freedom -- social forces may take away. This is not 
surprising, for what legal discretion necessarily accords is the freedom to be influenced by factors 
other than the law. When the law leaves open a range of choices, unless the choice is made 
randomly, it must be influenced by something other than and in addition to the law. Thus the 
exercise of discretion is not only influenced by the social and psychological circumstances in which 
a decision maker finds himself, but the existence of discretion invites others to try to influence its 
exercise. Moreover, the very act of choosing in one case affects the choice made in the next, and 
the experience of making a number of similar choices often leave a decision maker feeling that no 
choice exists a t  all. 
This sense of constraint is not necessarily a bad thing, for the consistent exercise of 
discretion is ordinarily something to be aimed at. Problems arise, however, because the tendency 
to use shallow case logics in repetitive decision .making make it likely that not all the factors that 
might shape the wise case- by-case exercise of discretion are considered. Thus the 1987 eviction 
board in routinely evicting non-payment tenants who owed rent ignored the reasons why the 
family was in debt, the family's need for public housing and the likelihood that a family that could 
not make a lump sum payment was nevertheless a good prospect to repay its rent debt over time. 
The 1969 board behaved similarly. In regularly giving second chances, it ignored the Authority's 
valid interest in immediately evicting tenants who, with no prospects of meeting the terms of a 
conditional deferment, could only increase their debt. At both points in time it might be said that 
the board abused its discretion by not using it, for the reason the legislature granted the board 
discretion was, a t  least arguably, so that it could consider each case on its peculiar facts and reach 
an  appropriate decision. Had the legislature wanted non-payment tenants behind on their rent to 
be always evicted or always give a second chance, it could have written this standard into law.59 
Behavioral regularities do not, of course, necessarily reflect the subjective mental processes 
that underlie them. I t  is conceivable that actors conscious of their own discretion and scrupulously 
attending to the variety of factors they are authorized to consider might nonetheless generate a 
pattern of decisions that an observer could easily categorize knowing only a few particulars. In 
the case of the eviction board, however, phenotypes do not obscure genotypes. Board deliberations 
indicate that board members feel bound by the same factors that one with access only to decisions 
would identify as  crucial. Yet, there are one or two cases (e.g. the case of Mrs. Sua) that do not 
fit the mold. These exceptions suggest that board members retain some sense of having 
discretion, but that it takes a truly striking situation to awaken this sense. Moreover, even 
exceptional decisions are constrained by the usual way of dealing with cases "of this type," with 
type being defined not by the family's extraordinary situation, but by the factor or factors that are 
ordinarily sufficient to determine outcomes. Thus the "breaks" that the 1987 board gave a few 
tenants in circumstances that made an extraordinary case for leniency would have been regarded 
as  particularly hard-hearted and narrow by the board that sat  in 1969. 
I expect the same is true of other decision makers with discretion. When decisions can be 
consistently predicted by a case feature or two that stands out, it is likely that the decision maker 
like the observer senses that little is left to di~cretion.~' In these circumstances it takes 
extraordinary circumstances to awaken in the decision maker a sense that a range of choices is 
open to him, and even then the range is unlikely to be coextensive with the decision maker's legal 
authority but is instead likely to be constrained by the decision maker's sense of what is usually 
5Y I t  is conceivable although I do not think it is the case here, that a legislature that wanted 
always to give tenants a second chance nevertheless wanted that chance to appear to be a 
fortuitous act of grace rather than a letgal entitlement. 
60 By contrast, the ability to predict decisions on the basis of decision maker characteristics like 
those one finds in some studies ofjudicial behavior (Goldman, 1975; Ulmer, 1973) is likely to tell 
us little about the decision maker's sense of acting with discretion. 
61 This may reflect a psychological phenomenon called "anchoring and adjustment." This 
phenomenon suggests that when a right answer is suggested but is known to be wrong, final 
decisions are distorted in the direction of the answer originally suggested. See e.g. Tversky, A. 
and D. Kahneman, 1974. 
These conclusions are based on a study of one institution, a public housing eviction board. 
Thus they must be regarded as hypothesis to be tested rather than as a priori predictions 
confirmed by investigation. Nevertheless, I believe that the eviction board does not differ greatly 
from many other decision makers in the way it exercises the discretion that law accords it, and I 
have cited studies of other decision makers that support this claim. Notably absent'from these 
citations have been studies of the law-making activities of appellate courts,62 the discretionary 
decisions that have received the most attention from philosophers and legal scholars. This is not 
an accident. Although a number of my conclusions may apply to discretionary law-making a t  the 
appellate level, there are two important reasons to expect that not all my conclusions will hold. 
First, the ability of most higher courts to control their dockets63 means that such courts are less 
likely than lower courts to be confronted with the steady stream of similar cases that is conducive 
to shallow case logics and a retreat from d i ~ c r e t i o n . ~ ~  Second, the law-making discretion that is 
accorded appellate courts contemplates that they will establish rules that are not only binding on 
others but will also bind their own future behavior except in exceptional circumstances. Thus the 
substitution of rules for discretion, which can betray the authority given by law in the cases of 
trial courts, hearing boards and street level bureaucrats, may embody that authority in the case of 
62 I have cited some research on appellate courts to support other points and I have suggested 
that an appellate court's exercise of discretion to hear cases, conforms to what one would expect 
based on principles derived from this study of the eviction board. 
63 The dockets of appellate courts are also shaped and limited by sociological factors such as  the 
costs of appeals. 
64 Where there are streams of cases that can be easily seen to be of the same type, one should 
expect to see appellate court decision making that resembles the decision making of the eviction 
board. Thus intermediate appellate courts seem to deal with the stream of criminal appeals they 
confront by broad rules of thumb (Davis, 1989), and I would argue that the recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court on the administration of the death penalty has, as  a result of the 
many such cases they confront, resulted in decisions that try to deny the relevance of distinctive 
facts and in this sense constitute a retreat from discretion. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree 476 
U.S. 162 (1986) [holding that even if data show that death quafied juries are more conviction 
prone than juries that are not death qualified, a defendant has no cause of action] and McCleskev 
v. Kemr, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) [holding that even if data show that death sentences in the 
aggregate appear to turn in part on racial considerations, an individual defendant has no cause of 
action]. Recently a Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, appointed by Chief 
Justice Rhenquist, has recommended that the number of appeals allowed defendants sentenced to 
death be drastically limited, thus removing occasions on which courts could exercise discretion. 
appellate courts, particularly "highest" ones. One reason why legal philosophers have focused as  
much a s  they do on discretion as  a quality of rules may be that for the courts that most attract 
their attention -- supreme courts -- there is less of a disjunction between discretion as  a quality of 
rules and discretion a s  a quality of behavior than there is when legal discretion is exercised a t  
other levels of the system. I hope, however, to have shown in this paper that if we are to 
understand discretion in all its aspects; we must not only look a t  the stars -- we must cast our 
eyes down as  well. 
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